the led in republican governments. And his contempt will eventually tempt us to enroll him among other disgraced yet discerning prophets in the history of political dissent.
Machiavelli hunted for tangible truths about republican Rome in Titus Livy's history, which circulated in the first century CE. It siphoned information from predecessors who relied on legend and subsequently lost sources to rehearse what is now called the city's 'conflict of the orders,' a struggle that supposedly attended the transition from regal to consular government in the late sixth and early fifth centuries, BCE. Reportedly, at the time, plebeians and patricians were at odds -the former extorting concessions from a senatorial elite. Livy and his sources, however, are now said to have exaggerated the plebeians' influence and, 'afflicted with numerous anachronisms,' cannot be used to reconstruct the socioeconomic texture of archaic Rome. As for 'the conflict of the orders,' which Machiavelli considered essential for good government, its extent and character during the first decades of the republic are impossible to determine with confidence. Some scholars suggest that Coriolanus was then confronting and criticizing an assortment of near destitute urban artisans and tenant farmers, a diverse, economically disadvantaged plebeian 'front' that seceded or went on strike to acquire political representation and a larger share of available wealth. But the apparent success of their efforts may indicate that they were led by affluent landowners and citizen soldiers able to afford the equipment necessary for military services and eager to check the patricians' power.
2 And, as Emilio Gabba notices, ambiguities and inaccuracies not only skewed what Livy wrote about the plebeians in the young republic but also affected the way his sources defined patricians. Gabba thinks the 'codification' of the Roman aristocracy occurred long after Coriolanus and the elites would have encountered commoners' agitation and their tribunes' demands. Hence, historians ought to approach all Roman sources for that stretch very cautiously, molto prudenti.
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Well into the twentieth century, however, most scholars accepted what Livy wrote about the early republic as 'highly reliable. ' 4 So we should not expect Machiavelli to have been unduly skeptical. Besides, Livy's story of Coriolanus's insolence and of the plebeians' reactions was too good to be untrue, which is to say that it fit Machiavelli's preconceptions and purposes. Livy had retrieved the political tensions that led, through the Roman tribunes' robust interventions, to the city's defensible verdict against Coriolanus -and to the restoration of order in Rome. In effect, Livy substantiated Machiavelli's claims that mistrust among the elites enabled commoners and their representatives to stabilize republican government. No wonder Machiavelli 'made the history of Titus Livy his Bible.' 5 And that 'bible' demonized Coriolanus. The context was significant. Livy explained that quarrels between plebeians and patricians were resolved after Rome's last king had been deposed and when commoners were granted the right to select tribunes to protect their interests. But crop failures in local fields, the arrival of corn from patricians' Sicilian estates, and prices charged by the patricians prompted Rome's commoners to demand price controls. According to Livy, Coriolanus proposed to use the crisis to cancel the concessions that, in his estimation, the plebeians had extorted from the senate. If they wanted to return to the prices that pertained when corn was plentiful, commoners, he submitted, must relinquish their newly acquired prerogatives and return full authority to the patricians. Coriolanus's blunt ultimatum and exploitation of the famine is thrown into greater relief in Livy's story by his description of another patrician's tact and tactics; his Menenius Agrippa reassured commoners that the patrician senate and moneyed interests it represented were vitally concerned with plebeians' wellbeing. The elites were comparable to a body's belly, Menenius explained; although more conspicuously industrious members of the body politic may suspect that the stationary stomach was idle, it was not; the belly, much as Rome's affluent elite, was busy, wisely distributing nourishment. Livy mentions that the commoners were fond of Menenius; however, his analogy was not an unqualified success. Plebeians' anger somewhat abated, yet they consented only to negotiations, the result of which were the concessions that Coriolanus deplored. 7 Livy's sympathies are with the commoners, and that obviously appealed to Machiavelli. They had protested peacefully. They forced the senate to negotiate by leaving the city, settling provisionally several miles away. They gave no other provocation, yet the suspense, Livy says, was paralysing. Plebeians, who had not 'seceded' and were left in Rome, were frightened that they might become targets of the city's patricians. Plebeians and patricians alike were tormented by the prospect that a Rome so divided, fear-filled, and, in effect, immobilized, might fall prey to its enemies. The senate concluded that reconciliation was required for Rome's defense. Historian Christopher Mackay claims that the senate's next steps -allowing commoners to elect tribunesmarked 'the beginning of the corporate organization of the plebs as a kind of state within the state.'
8 But, as we learned, many of Mackay's colleagues are unsure that sparring partners in early fifth-century Rome should be identified with relatively homogenous 'orders' or 'states.' Machiavelli, however, had no such reservations. He saw a new and desirable order emerging from 'the conflict of the orders' in archaic Rome. Livy seems to have been far less sanguine about the new order, although Thomas Baier thinks he was disposed to award 'ultimate authority' to the vox populi, if commoners could achieve sufficient unanimity to speak meaningfully with a single voice. Livy's sympathies are not easy to locate. Janet Chaplin seems sensible maintaining that his 'distillation of history into exempla' was meant to chart 'a way out' of the difficulties he and his first readers were experiencing. 10 Still, in his account of the emerging republic, Livy seems to use Coriolanus as an example of how to anger commoners and create difficulties, giving Machiavelli a chance to use Coriolanus as an occasion, not an example -an occasion to show how well the early Roman republican government worked. Coriolanus, as we just discovered, was unpopular for having proposed that grain be withheld until the plebeians were prepared to give up the authority they and their tribunes had lately acquired. Predictably, the plebeians were furious; had they rioted, Coriolanus would have been slaughtered, patricians would have taken precautions for self-defense, partisans of both sides, driven by fear or indignation, would have turned an incident into a feud, destabilizing Rome's new republic. 11 But tribunes, wasting no time, Machiavelli emphasized, summoned Coriolanus to argue his case, answer objections, and accept punishment. Unlike officials in the Republic of Florence, who provided their citizens no forum in which to vent their anger (sfogare), the tribunes in Rome found an effective way to spare their city the turmoil suffered by Machiavelli's. 12 Livy's Coriolanus was an exemplary soldier. He and a small squadron not only repelled a Volscian attack but carried the battle to his enemies, capturing the city of Corioli -and capturing, for Caius Martius, his cognomen. 13 Later, during a crisis precipitated by the senate's concessions and brought to a boil by Coriolanus's incivility, he was banished from Rome, joined the Volsces, all but supplanted their commander, and led their troops to avenge their previous humiliation -at his hands -and to settle his score against those who banished him.
14 Neither Machiavelli nor Livy appears to have been interested in the mechanics of the military maneuvers, yet both noticed that Coriolanus shrewdly sought to intensify 'the conflict of the orders' by plundering commoners' properties in the countryside and leaving those of the patricians untouched. Machiavelli admired the strategy. Commanders should sow dissension among enemies, he averred, coupling Hannibal with Coriolanus, two adepts waging psychological as well as bloody wars. 15 Coriolanus clearly met Livy's expectations that field commanders lead by example ( pugnando quam adhortando); belligerent action rather than talk inspired soldiers whose advance, in one of Livy's stories, was suddenly stalled by the death of a valued comrade. 16 Livy's Coriolanus -exceptional at action, excellent at soldiering -was an awkward talker, as he was in Petrarch's sketch and would be in Shakespeare's tragedy, 'a brilliant general lost in the tricks of politics.' 17 That observation, as it applies to Petrarch's Coriolanus, is Christopher Pelling's, with whom Machiavelli would have disagreed. The new regime in Rome, having expelled the city's king and just begun to program an emerging republic, was neither tricky nor treacherous. It was heading in the right direction. Two consuls were elected annually. Candidates were candid, not deceptive. Leaders were virtuous and resourceful. 18 When patricians threatened to deprive the plebeians of their prerogatives -as Coriolanus did -tribunes protected both, and, doing so, they preserved civility in the city as well as citizens' rights. Machiavelli was heartened by the results attributing everything good about Roman government to the plebeians' discontent and tribunes' interventions.
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His enthusiasm was undiminished by what Livy and others reported about the senate's ability to frustrate tribunes during the fifth century. 20 He saw no abyss open between the plebeians and patricians in the immediate aftermath of Rome's regal period. What mattered to him was that tribunes had stopped Coriolanus's bid to compel commoners to surrender their political advantages and status and that tribunes continued determinedly to preside over what John McCormick now imagines to have been a 'procedurally formalized popular discussion of and judgment over … the lives of the grandi.' 21 Machiavelli admitted that plebeians occasionally became overbearing, yet the greater danger, he continued, originated with the patricians, whose youth looked for chances to reassert their caste's political dominance. Even parents acknowledged that their children often were 'too savage,' nearly toppling the tribunate. But the office had survived for centuries in Rome, and Machiavelli lamented that fifteenth-and early sixteenth-century Florence had nothing comparable.
22 Archaic Rome's tribunes, agitating 'against ambition and insolence,' he claimed, constantly revived republican virtues.
Plebeians were ambitious, susceptible to temptations to improve their lot, economically and politically, but, conceding as much, Machiavelli nevertheless trusted that they were a safer bet than their patrician neighbors to be discerning and prudent. 24 The early modern Venetians, having deposited power with patricians, were less well governed than the Romans who handed over considerable authority to the plebeians (nelle mani della plebe). 25 The Romans had discovered that commoners were unlikely to be driven by a desire to dominate. Non essere dominati; liberation, not domination, was the plebeians' foremost concern, and, for Machiavelli, that priority was the factor that would keep the fabric of republics from being ripped by factions and greed. 26 'The people' proved more effective than princes. 'The people' were possessed of greater virtù.
27 When necessary, they asserted their authority, although never arrogantly (né mai dominò superbamente).
28 Coriolanus's contempt for them, notwithstanding his exceptional and exemplary lack of ambition, was enough to condemn him, to rally Livy's and Petrarch's plebeians as well as Machiavelli against him. 29 Here, Machiavelli was staking out an anomalous, if not also an awkward, position. To be sure, there was no sixteenth-century groundswell of opinion favoring Coriolanus, but Francesco Guicciardini, for one, suggested political tensions were unhealthy, that governments galloped toward disaster when influential theorists countenanced discord between the multitude and the moguls. Laudare le disunione, to praise friction was ludicrous. 30 Studying late medieval Italy, Machiavelli probably agreed. He deplored the sectarian spirit among early modern patricians. 31 The case can be made that he was hunting for a leader -in John Najemy's terms, for a 'redeemer-reformer' -to reformulate laws and revive respect for republican virtù in Italy. 32 Coriolanus was as far as one could be from becoming a model for Machiavelli's 'messiah. ' Few if any adaptations or interpretations of Shakespeare's Coriolanus cast the protagonist as a redeemer or reformer. But the play's plebeians and emergent Roman 26. Machiavelli, Discorsi 1.5, 2 and 1.5, 4, which predicts the infection, assuming that plebeians might be tempted to avenge themselves by despoiling patricians who despoiled them: 'che gli loro scorretti e ambiziosi portamenti accedano, ne' petti di chi non possiede, voglia di possedere o per vendicarsi contro di loro spogliandoli, o per potere ancora loro entrare in quelle richezza e in quelli onore che veggono essere male usati degli altri.' 27. Machiavelli 
and the implication is that Coriolanus, the character, was an occasion for each to put plebeian interests in a favorable light. 35 To me, this coupling is ill-conceived.
Although literary historian Anne Barton proposes a populist interpretation of the play, she still contends that Shakespeare's Coriolanus repudiates Machiavelli's positive spin on the tension or 'struggle' between patricians and plebeians. 36 And she has good cause to say so, for the protagonist explicitly complains that 'when two authorities are up, neither supreme' peace and calm give way to conflict and confusion; plebeian 'crows' 'peck the [patrician] eagles'; insults and partisan bickering replace serious deliberation. 'General ignorance' turns political conversations from over patricians Cosimo Rucellai and Zanobi Buondelmonti, the Discorsi's dedicatees, convincing them of 'the honest and decent rather than insolent and licentious nature of the people' so that the two would rally support for 'a more popularly participatory republic ' 'real necessities' to a scramble of trivial pursuits, which Coriolanus calls 'unstable slightness.' 37 'General ignorance'? Machiavelli's commoners are so shrewd that they are hardly ever deceived (quasi mai s'inganni). 38 The political intelligence, ignorance, and shrewdness of any population, of course, are eminently debatable. As one of Shakespeare's characters in Coriolanus says, 'our virtues lie in the interpretation of the time,' and interpretations of the time, even at that time, varied.
39 Those in the streets responsible for the so-called 'Arab Spring' have been lionized as courageous, liberal paladins of political freedom and simultaneously vilified as rabid Islamists and terrorists. 40 Likewise in sixteenth-century England, the authorities disagreed about commoners' political intelligence, steadfastness, and virtue. Commoners' competence was an issue in the 1540s -and again in the 1570s -as the religiously reformed debated the role of the laity in parish government. Tudor magistrates and ministers encountered lay refugees from the Continent who were accustomed to broadly participatory parish regimes. They hired and fired pastors. A few English church officials, including Archbishop Thomas Cranmer, were intrigued by that arrangement, but their fascination with the polities of those 'stranger churches' led to no innovative, democratic practices. 41 The English laity played a prominent part sustaining worship services during Queen Elizabeth's first years, after many Catholic priests were dismissed and while diocesan authorities sought religiously reformed replacements, but lay lectors retired -as ordered -as soon as replacements were found. 42 The subject of popular participation resurfaced thereafter at Cambridge, in discussions of church discipline. William Fulke introduced the idea that all people affected by decisions ought to have some say in sifting them (quod omnes tangit, ab omnibus debet), but that 'ought' was unpopular among the influential. When Shakespeare was still in Stratford-upon-Avon in the 1580s, and into the 1590s when he was settling in London, discussions of popular participation in policymaking were generally contained within discussions of church staffing and liturgy. What risks would attach if congregational decisions required commoners' consent? 44 Would ordinary people recognize the extraordinary gifts needed to manage colleagues and crises? Hugh Grady suggests Shakespeare's Roman plays, including Coriolanus, pondered the problems posed by putting 'great' leaders 'in a popular political context.' 45 Perhaps Livy and Plutarch sniffed around those issues as well. An early Elizabethan admirer of the former, William Painter, thought that Livy had emphasized the intolerance of the mob, which would have torn Coriolanus 'in pieces,' had the tribunes not intervened to save him.
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'Downe must the nobilitie goe'; Matthew Sutcliffe, dean of Exeter Cathedral, issued his warning, predicting what would happen to 'the great,' if government of the local churches were entrusted to ordinary congregants. He evoked the disturbances on the Continent during the 1530s that followed (and, he alleged, had been occasioned by) the religious radicals' experiments with participatory parish regimes. In 1590, when Sutcliffe published his warning, England's elites had some -but small -reason to fear the fate that, according to Painter, awaited Coriolanus, inasmuch as at least one dissident, who wanted to cut the hedges that the landed gentry planted to enclose arable land (keeping commoners and their livestock out), proposed 'cutting down [the] gentlemen' as well. 47 But Coriolanus is politically imprecise. Hugh Grady counts it as one of Shakespeare's two 'world-weary' plays. It does not consider politics to be 'an invigorating positive force,' Grady says, yet he seems incorrect when he characterizes the play's and playwright's take on archaic Rome's and on early modern England's politics as 'amoral' rather than immoral. The protagonist's opposition to the early republic is, after all, near fanatical. 48 Disingenuously, tribunes shift the blame onto him. They may seem, at first, to be justified calling him self-absorbed, 'insolent, o'ercome with pride, ambitious past all thinking, self-loving.' 49 But playgoers know that Coriolanus was not after power. Nominated consul by the senate, he nonetheless disdained its ritual celebration of his heroism. He left the senate's chamber instead of staying to hear his 'nothings monstered' in a colleague's speech. 50 He lacked tact and charm yet seemed genuinely humble. He only reluctantly agreed to display his wounds in the market to rally popular support for the nomination, then rapidly repented turning his scars into a sales pitch. His mother and Menenius, his mentor, would have had him stoop to conquer -that is, to win the plebeians' affection -but he held that pose poorly and for only a short time. 51 'Deficiencies' of that sort have been tabulated by historian James Kuzner, who relates them to the play's position on political pageantry, and specifically to its protagonist's objections to republican politics. Kuzner and others underscore the obvious, that Coriolanus 'stand[s] outside the social compact,' but Kuzner most emphatically argues that Shakespeare has his man reject the 'state's controlling fictions,' rituals, and rhetoric, because they, in effect, take away subjects' voices even as they pretend to take them seriously. Coriolanus will not conform to expectations. He will not be 'made meaningful.' 'Acknowledged agency, of which the people seem so covetous,' says Kuzner, is, for Coriolanus, inauthentic. 52 We cannot confidently infer what Shakespeare thought about personal authenticity from his Coriolanus's transparency and impetuosity. But we may say with certainty that protagonist (and possibly the playwright) would not have endorsed Machiavelli's classification of citizens' street demonstrations and secession, which forced patricians' concessions as bargaining tactics that stabilized the government. 53 In Shakespeare's play, the tribunes did all the bargaining for the people, inciting otherwise agreeable citizens to rebellion to increase the tribunes' leverage with the senate. Coriolanus as consul, they said, would make citizens 'of no more voice than dogs that are often beat for barking.' 54 But, in effect, and certainly in the end, the tribunes, not Coriolanus, steal the commoners' voices. True, the latter regretted the senate's concessions that created the tribunes, but those tribunes, Brutus and Sicinius, take liberties with the protagonist's impatience with plebeians' demands, turning it into something comprehensively misanthropic -and turning him into the people's 'fixed enemy. ' 55 Historian John Roe's observation is on the mark: Shakespeare's Coriolanus 'makes popular, conspiratorial Machiavels of the tribunes, whereas Machiavelli sees them as men of principle, whose disinterested application of the law' gets the new republic off to a good start. 56 In Machiavelli's narrative, Rome's plebeians were ready to attack the recklessly candid Coriolanus; the tribunes save him from them. In Coriolanus, Shakespeare's tribunes, at first, call a crowd to 'bear him to th' rock Tarpeian and from thence unto destruction cast him.' 57 Reading Plutarch's account of the agitation that attended the creation of the Roman republic, Shakespeare was acquainted with 'seditious' tribunes. 58 Furthermore, allegations of sedition were very much in the air in early modern England and in the minds of two of the realm's sovereigns. Elizabeth I silenced statesmen in the Lower House of Parliament claiming to represent the concerns of 'the commonality' in the late 1570s and 1580s, trying to legislate a further reform of the established church. Then and subsequently, the queen expressed her displeasure whenever her courtships became subjects for parliamentary debate. King James I was hostile to members of Parliament whose seemingly interminable debates were, in his estimation, stunts to avoid enacting what he most desired, a more perfect union between his two kingdoms, England and Scotland. But before we compare the tribunes' management of the electorate in Coriolanus with the representatives of 'The Commons,' we should be alert to the imperfect character of representation in Parliament. Local elites controlled the elections to the House of Commons. The possibilities for genuinely participatory regimes almost exclusively aired in debates about parishioners' prerogatives. So 'free consents' and 'free elections,' historian Oliver Arnold suggests, were phrases that seldom if ever could be applied to the Elizabethan and Jacobean parliamentary elections. Arnold may be correct ranking Shakespeare among political radicals determined to speak out about commoners' lack of voice. The playwright may well have expressed his displeasure in Coriolanus, suggesting that Rome's plebeians should 'never have traded in their rebellion for representation,' as Arnold indicates, but I think his simpler argument is more defensible -specifically, his judgment that Shakespeare's play displays its maker's fears that 'the representatives of the people might be oppressive masters rather than guardians of liberty.'
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On stage, this certainly is Coriolanus's reading of the commoners' masters and, I will suggest, it was prophetic. But Machiavelli, for his part, was unworried about such potential popular usurpers. From what he learned about the Roman republic, he concluded that, in hundreds of elections during its hundreds of years, the citizens chose no more than four wicked tribunes or consuls. Shakespeare approached the problem of representation from a different angle. He found that Rome's tribunes wickedly manipulated the plebeians, who were too trusting and easily gulled; Mikail Hörnquist suggests that 'the Rome of [Shakespeare's] Coriolanus is an archaic state which still has a long way to go before becoming the perfect republic Machiavelli speaks of in the Discourses.' 60 His Coriolanus berates the senate for having ever set the city on that course. His mother scolds him for being 'too absolute,' for criticizing concessions, and for failing to 'Controlling Elites,' p. 307, analysing another section of the Discorsi (1.48), which appears to acknowledge commoners' gullibility. Nobles present a slate of first-rate patricians and secondrate plebeians for commoners to consider. They select the former, 'confirm their virtue,' and 'do not see through the nomination strategy.' comprehend that 'policy' dictates compromises. His mentor Menenius agrees, adding that the protagonist's 'nature is too noble for this world.' 61 On both counts, nobility and intransigence, Coriolanus exhibited traits that we tend to associate with prophets disenchanted with the reigning rituals and routines of their time and place, because they failed to inspire virtue and justice. Prophets' disaffiliation means that they can never be at home in their homelands. Coriolanus comes to us dishonored, disaffected, and nearly throttled after the first three acts of Shakespeare's play, at which point, having been banished, he leaves Rome for 'a world elsewhere.' 62 He does not vanish from the stage. The final two acts have him in the company of his former enemies, the Volscians, leading them to the gates of Rome. But a delegation dissuades him from attacking. His mother, wife, and young son shame him for having turned on the city that turned on him. The tribunes wrongly and wickedly accuse him of ambition, and, although his actions during the final acts could be construed as corroboration, neither Shakespeare nor Plutarch would give Coriolanus's self-interest and ambition much play. 63 But, plausibly, the playwright's ambition and irritation with commoners got stage time in Coriolanus. Historian Robert Ormsby imagines that dramatists who were also entrepreneurs may have been restless. The success of a play and the fate of a theater company could depend on audiences that were 'comprised of the socially and mentally unfit whose judgments,' if we may trust literature that was patently antitheatrical, were 'mutable and harmful.' Shakespeare's Coriolanus, in the first scene of the first act, echoes that estimate: 'with every minute you do change your mind and call him noble that was now your hate, him vile that was your garland.' Did the playwright rake into his character's contempt his own displeasure at having the whims of 'the vulgar sort' to some extent control his plays' reception and profit margin? 64 Stephen Greenblatt usefully reminds us that Shakespeare, whose investments were nearly as dependent on the fickle, 'vulgar [or common] sort' as on early modern aristocratic patronage, was, unlike Machiavelli, a man whose leisure was gladly spent among commoners. Machiavelli once wrote 'with disgust of the vulgar arguments and stupid games he was forced to watch' after he had been forcibly retired from the diplomatic
